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A defendant has been charged with conspiracy to commit arson and insurance fraud after his restaurant burned to the ground late one night. At trial, the prosecutor presents evidence that, two days before the fire, the defendant paid $10,000 to a man who was later seen entering the restaurant shortly before the fire started. The man has invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege and refuses to testify at the defendant's trial. The prosecutor calls the man's fiancée, who testifies that on the day of the fire, she noticed that the man seemed nervous and asked him what was wrong. She says that he told her, «I'm getting paid $10,000 to burn down a restaurant tonight, and I'm a little nervous about it.» The defendant objects to the admission of the man's statement to the fiancée, relying on the hearsay rule and the confrontation clause.
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A is incorrect. The man's statement satisfies the hearsay exception for declarations against interest. The man is unavailable to testify and his statement to his fiancée was so contrary to his penal interest that one would not expect him to make it unless it were true.
B is incorrect. The Sixth Amendment does not control the admission of nontestimonial hearsay statements. The man's statement to his fiancée would be considered nontestimonial because it was not made for the primary purpose of assisting with a criminal investigation, and the man would have had no expectation that a statement to a loved one would be so used.
D is incorrect. The man's comments to his fiancée about his feelings regarding the conspiracy did not «further» the conspiracy or advance the aims of his venture with the defendant, as required by the coconspirator exception. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). Additionally, federal courts have held that idle chatter by coconspirators does not further the conspiracy and therefore cannot fit within the exception.