1. If the governor asserts against the television station a claim of damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, will the governor prevail?

To establish a prima facie case for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the following elements must be proved: (i) an act by the defendant amounting to extreme or outrageous conduct; (ii) an intent by the defendant to cause the plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress, or a recklessness by the defendant as to the effect of their conduct; (iii) causation; and (iv) damages in the form of severe emotional distress.

To establish a prima facie case for defamation, the following elements must be proved: (i) defamatory language on the part of the defendant; (ii) that the defamatory language was of or concerning the plaintiff; (iii) publication of the defamatory language by the defendant to a third person; and (iv) damage to the reputation of the plaintiff. When defamation refers to a public concern or involves a matter of public concern, the plaintiff also needs to prove falsity and fault by the defendant.

As held by the United States Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan, to prevail against a defendant on defamation of a public figure, the plaintiff must establish actual malice by the defendant by demonstrating that the defendant knew the statement was false or had a reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity.

D is correct. The governor would not prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against the television station, because the television station did not publish a false statement of fact with «actual malice.» For the governor to prevail against the television station on his claim, he would be required to demonstrate that the television station engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct with an intent to cause him to suffer severe emotional distress. Not only is there no evidence of malicious intent by the station directed specifically at the governor, but as a threshold matter, none of the television station's actions would qualify as extreme or outrageous conduct.

The television station needed to have acted with actual malice in order for its news coverage to be considered extreme or outrageous conduct. Here, however, there is no indication that the station knowingly or recklessly published false statements. In particular, the protest signs are not statements of fact false but are statements of opinion. The governor would not prevail on a defamation claim against the television station due to the absence of actual malice, and the governor's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim fail, because absent actual malice, the station's reporting could not have qualified as extreme or outrageous conduct. Therefore, the television station would not be liable for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.

A is incorrect. The governor would not prevail on his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against the television station on the basis that the broadcast caused him to suffer severe emotional distress. Although damages in the form of severe emotional distress are one element of a prima face case for intentional infliction of emotional distress, they are only one element and therefore, are not sufficient in themselves to allow liability to attach to the defendant. A plaintiff is also required to prove that the defendant engaged in extreme or outrageous conduct with the (successful) intent to inflict emotional distress. There is no evidence supporting either claims under the facts as presented. Further, even if the broadcast did qualify as extreme or outrageous conduct, there is no evidence that it was broadcast with an intent to cause the governor to suffer from emotional distress.

B is incorrect. The governor would not prevail on his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against the television station on the basis that the assertion on the signs was extreme and outrageous. Even if it was extreme and outrageous for the protestors to display signs branding the governor as a murderer, this factor would be irrelevant to the governor's claim against the television station, because the protestors are third parties unconnected to the claim.

C is incorrect. Although the governor would not prevail against the television station on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the governor's recovery would not be barred because the governor did not suffer physical harm as a consequence of the emotional distress caused by the signs. Although physical injury caused by severe emotional distress can be cited as evidence of damages, a plaintiff is not required to submit evidence of physical harm in order to prevail for intentional infliction of emotional distress.