29. Is the federal statute constitutional?

Congress may not force state or local governments to create or enforce laws. In other words, the federal government may not force or coerce state legislatures into passing specific statutes. In New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), the Supreme Court held that the concept of federalism embedded in the Tenth Amendment prevents Congress from requiring states to enact laws or to administer federal law.

Congress may encourage state legislatures to pass certain laws by, for example, conditioning receipt of federal funding on passing laws, via Congress's spending power under Article I, Section 8. But even then, if a spending act imposes limitations on a state, or attaches «strings,» the limitations must be: (i) merely an incentive and not a compulsion; (ii) clearly stated; and (iii) related to the act's purpose (also phrased as having a «nexus» between the purpose and the limitations).

Although Congress has the power to appropriate money to serve the general welfare of the United States, there is no provision of the Constitution that gives Congress power generally to regulate for the general welfare.

The Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate economic or commercial activity that, in the aggregate, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The sale of controlled substances is a commercial activity.

A is correct. This statute is unconstitutional because Congress does not have the authority to force a state legislature to pass specific laws under the Tenth Amendment principles of state sovereignty. Here, Congress is not merely conditioning the receipt of federal funds on enacting legislation; it is directly coercing state legislatures to enact a specific law.

B is incorrect. This answer reaches the correct answer with the wrong reasoning. It is true that the sale of controlled substances is a commercial activity within the meaning of the Commerce Clause. The facts disclose «a dramatic increase in the number of elementary and secondary school students bringing controlled substances to school for sale,» suggesting that, in the aggregate, this activity has a sufficient effect on interstate commerce to bring the regulation within Congress's commerce power. In addition, the statutory limitation requiring that any controlled substance must have been previously transported in interstate commerce would likely provide a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce to fall within Congress's commerce powers. This means this statute is not outside the scope of congressional commerce powers. However, the statute is nevertheless unconstitutional because, as explained above, Congress may not force or coerce state legislatures to pass specific laws.

C is incorrect. As previously stated, whether the statute activates congressional commerce powers is not the proper issue to determine here. Even though the statute would ensure, on a case-by-case basis, that controlled substances within its terms would, in fact, affect interstate commerce, Congress may never compel or force states to pass specific laws. This is rooted in federalism, as laid out by the Tenth Amendment, and affirmed by the Supreme Court in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).

D is incorrect. Neither of these sources of broad authority, the General Welfare Clause or the Commerce Clause, can overcome the constitutional violation by Congress seeking to force states into passing specific laws. As discussed above, the aggregate effect of drug sales near schools may very well substantially affect commerce, but that will not preclude the violation. Moreover, Congress may not justify the statute as a proper spending measure because the requirement that states pass the law is not merely an incentive, but a mandate.