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In a civil trial arising from a car accident at an intersection, the plaintiff testified on direct examination that he came to a full stop at the intersection. On cross-examination, the defendant's lawyer asked whether the plaintiff claimed to have been exercising due care at the time, and the plaintiff replied that he had been driving carefully. At a sidebar conference, the defendant's lawyer sought permission to ask the plaintiff about two accidents in the previous 12 months in which he had received traffic citations for failing to stop at stop signs. The plaintiff's lawyer has objected.
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Regarding «prior bad acts,» the traditional majority view is that, subject to discretionary control of the trial judge, a witness may be interrogated upon cross-examination with respect to any immoral or criminal act of his life that may affect his character and show him to be unworthy of belief. Inquiry into «bad acts» is permitted even though the witness was never convicted. Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 608 permits such inquiry, at the discretion of the court, only if the act of misconduct is probative of truthfulness (i.e., an act of deceit or lying).
A is correct. The court should not allow defense counsel to inquire about the prior accidents because such evidence of «prior bad acts» is not probative of truthfulness (i.e., an act of deceit or lying) and is merely being offered to show that a prior behavior pattern (failing to properly stop in the past) indicates that the plaintiff did the same thing here (failed to stop at the intersection). FRE 608(b) allows impeachment by prior bad acts that bear upon truthfulness, which failing to stop at an intersection does not. This is also not a proper impeachment by contradiction because the fact that the plaintiff had two prior accidents does not contradict his current testimony that in this instance, he did in fact stop. Essentially, the defendant is trying to show that the plaintiff is a careless driver. Carelessness is a character trait, and evidence of a person's character is not admissible in a civil case to prove how that person acted on the occasion in question.
B is incorrect. This answer reaches the correct answer with the wrong reasoning. The court should not allow the inquiry into the prior accidents, but not because they failed to result in convictions. The lack of a conviction is not a bar to admitting prior misconduct for impeachment. Rather, the basis for excluding the prior bad acts is because they are not probative of truthfulness, as required under FRE 608(b), and are not contradictory to the in-court testimony, as explained above.
C is incorrect. FRE 404(a) generally prevents the admission of evidence of a person's character to prove conduct in conformity therewith in civil cases. The claim that the plaintiff failed to stop on other occasions, and therefore likely did the same thing here, falls squarely within that prohibition. The contention that the past failures to stop bear on the plaintiff's credibility is incorrect, as does not demonstrate untruthfulness, as stated above.
D is incorrect. This is not proper material for impeachment by contradiction because a person can act carefully on one occasion and fail to do so on another. As such, the prior accidents do not contradict the in-court testimony regarding the accident at issue. If the plaintiff had testified that he had never run a stop sign, then the prior acts would contradict his testimony.