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The faculty member did not appeal the decision of the state administrative board to the state courts. Instead, she sought a declaratory judgment in federal district court to the effect that the state statute prescribing the procedures for her dismissal is unconstitutional.
Three months after her dismissal, she was granted a hearing before the state administrative board. The board upheld her dismissal, finding that the charge against her was supported by a preponderance of the evidence presented at the hearing.
A teacher who had been employed continuously for seven years as a faculty member at the state university was dismissed. A week before the dismissal took effect, she was informed that she was being dismissed because of a charge that she accepted a bribe from a student in return for raising the student's final grade in her course. At that time she requested an immediate hearing to contest the propriety of her dismissal.
A state statute declares that after five years of continuous service in their positions, all state employees, including faculty members at the state university, are entitled to retain their positions during «good behavior.» The statute also contains a number of procedural provisions. Any state employee who is dismissed after that five-year period must be given reasons for the dismissal before it takes effect. In addition, such an employee must, upon request, be granted a post-dismissal hearing before an administrative board to seek reinstatement and back pay. The statute precludes any other hearing or opportunity to respond to the charges. That post-dismissal hearing must occur within six months after the dismissal takes effect. The burden of proof at such a hearing is on the state, and the board may uphold the dismissal only if it is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. An employee who is dissatisfied with a decision of the board after a hearing may appeal its decision to the state courts. The provisions of this statute are inseverable.
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An example of a property interest is continued public employment; if an employee already has the job, then she may have a property interest that entitles her to fair procedures before that job can be taken away. When there is a state statute that creates a public employment contract in which an employee may only be fired for «cause,» there is a property interest. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
Once you determine that a person's property interest is being impaired, you have to determine exactly what «process» the person is entitled to receive. Proper process typically involves two requirements: (i) notice; and (ii) an opportunity to respond before the termination of that interest. For example, a public employee who is subject to removal only for «cause» (and who, therefore, has a property interest in his job) generally must be given notice of charges against her that are to be the basis for her job termination, and a pre-termination opportunity to respond to those charges. However, the court may allow a post-termination hearing in situations where a pre-termination hearing is highly impracticable.
Due process requires an opportunity to present objections to the proposed termination to a fair, neutral decision-maker (not necessarily a judge). Fair process in terms of the timing and scope of the hearing varies according to the circumstances of the deprivation. The court should conduct a balancing test and weigh: (i) the importance of the individual interest involved; (ii) the value of specific procedural safeguards to that interest; and (iii) the governmental interest in fiscal and administrative efficiency. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
C is correct. In this case, the employee was not given any kind of hearing or opportunity to respond before her dismissal, rather, the hearing took place three months after her termination became effective. And there is no evidence that a pre-termination hearing would have been highly impracticable. Therefore, the court should hold the statute unconstitutional on the basis that it is a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A is incorrect. The case is ripe for adjudication and therefore, the court should hear the case. It is not required that all judicial remedies in state courts be fully exhausted before a federal court may hear a case. The federal judiciary has the power to hear cases arising under the Constitution. And, for a case to be ripe and thus sufficiently concrete to be worthy of adjudication, there must be at least a reasonable probability of reasonably specific harm (or actual harm). Here, the teacher has been injured by being terminated, so her controversy is ripe. She does not need to wait for the state to fail to correct her termination before proceeding in federal court.
B is incorrect. This answer reaches the correct answer with the wrong reasoning. The statute is unconstitutional because it amounts to a deprivation of the teacher's property interest in continued public employment. There is no standard in place requiring a state to demonstrate the facts constituting good cause for termination of a state employee beyond a reasonable doubt. Typically, the court will conduct a balancing test between: (i) the importance of the individual interest involved; (ii) the value of specific procedural safeguards to that interest; and (iii) the governmental interest in fiscal and administrative efficiency. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
D is incorrect. This is a misstatement of the law. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not merely entitle employees who have a right to their jobs during good behavior to a statement of reasons for their dismissal and an opportunity for a post-dismissal hearing. Rather, such employees are entitled to notice and a pre-termination opportunity to respond. Although the court may allow a post-termination hearing when a pre-termination hearing is highly impracticable, there are no facts here to suggest this is the case.