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A woman moved to the state two months ago seeking permanent employment. Her physician recommends non-emergency surgery to treat a medical condition. The surgery would qualify for state funding if the woman had resided in the state for a year. The woman has sued to invalidate the state law that prohibits state funding of her surgery.
A state generally provides funding for the medical care of its residents who cannot afford such care. State law, however, prohibits use of this state funding for surgery for any person who has resided in the state for less than one year, except in emergency situations.
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When a state uses a durational residency requirement (a waiting period) for dispensing benefits, that requirement should normally be subject to strict scrutiny. This means that the government must show that the waiting period requirement is tailored to promote a compelling interest. However, in some right to travel cases, the Court has been unclear as to whether it is actually using strict scrutiny. The important point is that state residency requirements should not be upheld merely because they have some theoretical rational relationship to an arguably legitimate interest of the government. For example, a one-year waiting period before a person may receive state-subsidized medical care has been held to be invalid. See Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
D is correct. Here, the state offered no evidence of a compelling government interest that is served by subjecting newer residents to a waiting period for receiving funds for non-emergent surgeries, which means the law fails to satisfy strict scrutiny. Absent such a compelling interest, the woman should be treated equally as any other permanent resident, even if she only moved there two months ago. Therefore, this law interferes with her fundamental right to travel and should be held unconstitutional. See Mem'l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
A is incorrect. Even if the law serves the interest of reasonably conserving the state's limited resources, its interference with the woman's right to travel demands application of strict scrutiny. Therefore, a theoretically rational relationship between the waiting period and the preservation of resources will not be enough to be upheld.
B is incorrect. The law restricts the woman's right to travel because it deprives her of the privileges given to other residents of the state. This type of regulation on a fundamental right triggers strict scrutiny, which demands more than a reasonable relationship to the interest of preserving state funds. Moreover, the woman is not a «transient nonresident,» she is a new permanent resident, which guarantees her the right to be treated equally to any other resident of that state.
C is incorrect. This answer reaches the correct answer with the wrong reasoning, as well as makes an incorrect statement of the law. The Court has never held that there is a fundamental right to health care.