37. On cross motions for directed verdicts on the issue of liability at the conclusion of the proofs, the court should

A general duty of care is imposed on all human activity. When a person engages in an activity, he is under a legal duty to act as an ordinary, prudent, reasonable person. It is presumed that an ordinary, prudent, reasonable person will take precautions against creating unreasonable risks of injury to other people. However, the plaintiff must show that the defendant owed a legal duty to people in the same position as the plaintiff. If a defendant's conduct creates an unreasonable risk of injury to someone in the position of a plaintiff, the general duty of care extends from the defendant to the plaintiff. No duty is imposed on a person, however, to take precautions against events that cannot reasonably be foreseen.

The circumstantial evidence doctrine of res ipsa loquitur («the thing speaks for itself») deals with situations where the mere fact that an injury occurred can establish or tend to establish a breach of duty. Where the facts strongly indicate that the plaintiff's injuries resulted from the defendant's negligence, the trier of fact may be permitted to infer that the defendant was probably negligent.

A directed verdict is a ruling entered by a trial judge after determining that there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to reach a different conclusion.

C is correct. Only the motorist's motion should be granted because the facts stipulated to at trial show that the motorist did not breach his duty of care. As such, there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find the motorist negligent. Every person owes a general duty of care to act reasonably prudent, which includes taking precautions against creating unreasonable risks of injury to others. An unconscious person cannot be held liable for acts he had no control over unless it was foreseeable that a medical cause or condition would cause him to blackout and precautions were not taken.

Here, the parties stipulated that before the heart attack, the motorist had followed the law while driving, that he had no history indicating he was at-risk for a heart attack, and that he ran the red light while unconscious. Taken together, these facts show that the motorist acted reasonably and created no unreasonable risk of injury to anyone else, including the child. There is no direct evidence that the motorist had failed his duty to exercise due care.

A is incorrect. The safety statute cannot be applied to show negligence per se because the motorist was unconscious when his car went through the stoplight. The motorist can only be held liable for negligence if it was foreseeable that he would lose consciousness while driving but did not take any precautions against the possibility.

B is incorrect. This answer applies the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which applies where the evidence shows, based on the mere fact that an injury occurred in the way it did, that the defendant breached his duty. However, this doctrine does not apply here, where the parties stipulated that the motorist had begun to slow down before the heart attack. The motorist was unconscious and thus not in control of the instrumentality. The issue is not one of inferring negligence but of determining if the motorist had a duty to take precautions against having a heart attack while driving.

D is incorrect. A directed verdict should be granted where there is no legally sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to find against the moving party. Here, the stipulations alone show that the motorist did not breach his duty of care, as explained above. Therefore, the court should grant the motorist's motion and deny the child's, rather than submit the case to the jury.