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Early last year, the Commission found that a particular energy company met all statutory requirements and, therefore, voted to issue the energy company a license authorizing it to construct a nuclear energy plant. Because they believed that the issuance of a license to the energy company was not in accord with the applicable statutory criteria, a majority of each of the two houses of Congress voted, within the specified 30-day period, to veto the license. On the basis of that veto, the Commission refused to issue the license. Subsequently, the energy company sued the Commission in an appropriate federal district court, challenging the constitutionality of the Commission's refusal to issue the license.
A federal statute prohibits the construction of nuclear energy plants without a license from the Federal Nuclear Plant Siting Commission. The statute provides that the Commission may issue a license authorizing the construction of a proposed nuclear energy plant 30 days after the Commission makes a finding that the plant will comply with specified standards of safety, technological and commercial feasibility, and public convenience. In a severable provision, the Commission's enabling statute also provides that the Congress, by simple majorities in each house, may veto the issuance of a particular license by the Commission if such a veto occurs within 30 days following the required Commission finding.
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Legislation is typically required for Congress to monitor federal agencies, including when it seeks to control structures, funding, and regulations. This legislative action must abide by bicameral constitutional requirements, meaning, it must be: (i) approved by both houses of Congress; and (ii) presented to the President for either signature or veto. U.S. Const. art. I, §§1 and 7.
The legislative veto is a device that enables Congress to monitor actions by the executive branch, including federal administrative agencies. A one-house legislative veto is unconstitutional because it violates both the President's veto power and the bicameral structure of Congress. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. (INS) v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Under Chadha, the one-house legislative veto is completely unusable. If the House or Senate wants to reserve power to undo the action of an administrative agency, both houses have to pass the same bill and present it to the President for a possible veto. A two-house legislative veto, in the vast majority of instances, is just as unconstitutional as single-house veto provision, because both deprive the President of the opportunity to exercise his veto power.
B is correct. When Congress seeks to exercise legislative veto power in furtherance of controlling federal agencies, such an action must abide by Article I, Sections 1 and 7, requiring a bicameral majority vote and presentation to the President for signature or veto. Most instances of two-house vetoes have been held unconstitutional because they deprive the President of the opportunity to exercise his veto power. In this case, because the legislative veto was never presented to the President, and this type of congressional action requires this step, the veto was invalid.
A is incorrect. This answer reaches the correct answer with the wrong reasoning. Although it is true that Article III of the Constitution empowers the judicial branch, Congress has its own power to take legislative measures around the monitoring of federal agencies, including the issuance of licenses. This does not amount to judicial action, but rather, legislative action to monitor federal agencies. However, as stated above, the veto is still invalid because it was never presented to the President for signature.
C is incorrect. It is true that Congress has the authority, pursuant to the Commerce Clause, to regulate the construction of nuclear energy plants. However, this broad congressional authority is still subject to other constitutional requirements. One such requirement is that a legislative action of this nature receive bicameral approval and be presented to the President, which did not occur in this case.
D is incorrect. Congress may have a compelling interest in regulating the establishment of nuclear plants for public health and safety reasons, but its actions were invalid because it cannot act alone without presidential sign-off. Additionally, Congress would not have needed a compelling state interest to regulate nuclear siting, because the facts present no deprivation of a fundamental right or classification based on a protected class.