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The woman is charged with receiving stolen property. She moves pretrial to suppress the evidence relating to the three automobiles on the ground that the inspection was unconstitutional.
Police officers assigned to a particular city's automobile crimes unit periodically visited all motor vehicle junkyards in town to make the inspections permitted by the statute. A woman owned such a business in the city. One summer day, the officers asked to inspect the vehicles on her lot. The woman said, «Do I have a choice?» The officers told her she did not. The officers conducted their inspection and discovered three stolen automobiles.
A state enacted a statute to regulate administratively the conduct of motor vehicle junkyard businesses in order to deter motor vehicle theft and trafficking in stolen motor vehicles or parts thereof. The statute requires a junkyard owner or operator to permit representatives of the Department of Motor Vehicles or any law enforcement agency upon request during normal business hours to take physical inventory of motor vehicles and parts thereof on the premises. The statute also states that a failure to comply with any of its requirements constitutes a felony.
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The Supreme Court has ruled that as long as there is a high governmental interest at stake, the warrantless inspections are necessary to further those interests, and the statute allowing the inspections serves the same functions as a warrant, then evidence found pursuant to those searches should not be suppressed. In New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987), the Supreme Court found the searches pursuant to the regulation of the automobile junkyard industry to be valid.
C is correct. Because owners and operators of commercial properties in highly regulated industries have a lower expectation of privacy and the statute here imposes limits on the officers' authority to conduct searches, it is reasonable. Moreover, searches pursuant to the regulation of the automobile junkyard industry have been found to be valid by the U.S. Supreme Court. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
A is incorrect. The officers' discretion is limited in time, place, and scope, meaning that their discretion is not unbridled. There are several limiting factors to keep their discretion in check, including that the searches can only: (i) be conducted on junkyard premises; (ii) be of vehicles and parts; and (iii) occur during the junkyard's normal business hours.
B is incorrect. The issue here is whether the government has a valid interest in regulating this industry, which would, therefore, offer the same protections that would otherwise come from a valid warrant. Because the Court held in Burger that a warrantless inspection of these types of commercial premises is reasonable, it is not a pretext and therefore constitutionally permissible.
D is incorrect. Administrative searches in this type of context must meet certain criteria to be constitutionally valid; not all warrantless searches of commercial premises are permissible. A regulation of this type must apply to an industry that is closely regulated, and the regulations allowing the searches must be necessary to further valid governmental interests, and the discretion must be limited.