56. Can the cellmate's testimony be admitted in a joint trial over the second defendant's objection?

Using a non-testifying co-defendant's inculpatory statement against the accused at trial presumably violates the accused's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. In co-defendant confession cases, the Confrontation Clause requires that an original defendant be given the opportunity to cross-examine a co-defendant whose confession is being used against the original defendant.

Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 105 states: «If the court admits evidence that is admissible against a party or for a purpose — but not against another party or for another purpose — the court, on timely request, must restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.»

The Fifth Amendment has been interpreted to protect defendants against compelled self-incrimination under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Warnings given pursuant to Miranda and a valid waiver of those rights are prerequisites to the admissibility of any confession made during custodial interrogation.

B is correct. The cellmate's testimony should not be admitted over the second defendant's objection because a limiting instruction would not be sufficient to protect the second defendant's constitutional right to confrontation. The first defendant made a confession regarding his guilt and the guilt of the second defendant. However, the first defendant himself is not testifying, which prevents the second defendant from having the opportunity to confront him on it. The Confrontation Clause requires that a defendant (here, the second defendant) be given an opportunity to cross-examine a co-defendant (here, the first defendant) whose confession is being used against him. The limiting instruction would not preclude a constitutional violation if this confession were introduced without the opportunity for confrontation.

A is incorrect. This answer reaches the correct answer with the wrong reasoning. Although the cellmate's testimony should not be admitted over the second defendant's objection, it is not because there were no Miranda warnings given. The second defendant cannot claim a Miranda violation in the name of the first defendant, as he lacks standing to do so. The right to be given Miranda warnings belongs to the person subject to custodial interrogation, not to third parties. Moreover, Miranda warnings would not have been required anyway because the statement to the cellmate by the first defendant was not made as a result of custodial interrogation or otherwise compelled.

C is incorrect. The declaration against penal interest is an exception to the hearsay rule, which is not a basis for admitting the cellmate's testimony here. The cellmate's testimony would be otherwise admissible as a statement by a party-opponent. A hearsay exception is thus not required to admit the cellmate's testimony. What would be required is an opportunity for the second defendant to cross-examine the first defendant regarding the statement, but the first defendant is not testifying. As such, the testimony should be excluded.

D is incorrect. On the contrary, the limiting instruction would not be sufficient to avoid the likelihood that the jury would only consider it to inculpate the first defendant. Without an opportunity to cross-examine the first defendant, the constitutional violation remains and no limiting instruction will resolve it.