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The woman has moved to suppress the evidence seized on the ground that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated.
The police suspected a woman of dealing in stolen credit cards. An undercover police officer knocked on the woman's door and told her that he was willing to pay for usable credit cards. When the woman asked if he was a police officer, the officer replied, «No,» giving her a false name and saying, «You can call Harvey—he'll vouch for me.» The woman admitted him to her house. After she left the room to call Harvey, the officer lifted some papers off a desk and underneath discovered three credit cards bearing different names. He seized the cards, and when the woman returned, he arrested her.
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C is correct. The illegal fruits (credit cards) were not in plain view in this case. Rather, they were hidden underneath papers and not in plain sight. As such, the seizure of the papers was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment and the evidence should be suppressed.
A is incorrect. Evidence that is in plain sight is an exception to the warrant rule. Here, the credit cards were covered by papers and thus not in plain sight. There would have been nothing immediately apparent about the credit cards to the undercover police officer.
B is incorrect. Had the officer seen the credit cards in plain view, her consent to allow his entry would have supported the exception to the warrant requirement because he was there legally. However, the credit cards were covered by papers and therefore the plain view doctrine doesn't apply.
D is incorrect. This answer reaches the correct answer with the wrong reasoning. Undercover officers utilizing deceit to gain consent for entry is permissible. According to Lewis v. United States, «a government agent, in the same manner as a private person, may accept an invitation to do business and may enter upon the premises for the very purposes contemplated by the occupant.» 385 U.S. 206 (1966). Here, although the officer used deceit to gain entry, he would not be violating the woman's Fourth Amendment rights and the evidence would not be suppressed on these grounds. Rather, the fact that the credit cards weren't in plain view renders this exception inapplicable.