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38. Should the defendant's motion be granted?
The defendant subsequently moved to suppress the teller's testimony, claiming that the lineup violated his privilege against self-incrimination. At the suppression hearing, the teller testified that she had not gotten a good look at the robber's face, because the robber had been wearing a hat pulled down over most of his face, but that she was certain the defendant was the robber because she had recognized his voice at the lineup.
A defendant was lawfully arrested for bank robbery, without an arrest warrant. He was not given Miranda warnings but was immediately taken to a police station, where he and five other men were placed in a lineup to be viewed by the bank teller who had been on duty at the time of the robbery. Each man was required to say the words spoken by the bank robber: «Give me all your money. I've got a gun.» After all the men in the lineup spoke those words, the teller identified the defendant as the robber.
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B is incorrect. This explanation for why the defendant's suppression motion should be denied is overbroad and therefore incorrect; testimony based on firsthand observation may be suppressed in certain cases if the testimony derived from an unconstitutional identification procedure. See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
C is incorrect. Requiring the defendant to utter the words spoken by the bank robber did not violate his constitutional rights because it was not considered «testimonial» under Hubbell.
D is incorrect. As stated above, requiring the defendant to utter the words spoken by the bank robber was not a compelled «testimonial» communication. Accordingly, it was not necessary to provide Miranda warnings, which are designed to protect the privilege against self-incrimination. See generally Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990).